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Abstract
The potential introduction of genetically modified (GM) wheat has both supporters and
opponents waging battle in the popular press and scholarly research.  Supporters highlight the
benefits to producers, while the opponents highlight the unknown safety factors for consumers.
The topic is very important to the United States, as a large portion of the wheat production is
exported overseas.  Consumer groups in some countries are resisting GM wheat.
This study utilizes a spatial equilibrium model to evaluate the trade impacts associated
with GM wheat introduction along with several assumed post-GM adoption scenarios.  Wheat is
converted into protein equivalents to allow for substitution between wheat classes.
The importance of the U.S. handling/transportation system is highlighted in the ability of
the system to develop an affordable and effective segregation system for GM wheat.  Producers
who do not produce GM wheat would face externalities associated with GM wheat
contamination of non-GM wheat.
Keywords: genetically modified wheat, spatial equilibrium model, trade flows, protein
equivalents, externalitiesiv
Highlights
The potential introduction of Genetically Modified (GM) wheat has been in the news for
several years.  Because of consumer concern over the safety of the product, acceptance in
overseas markets is questionable.  This is an especially important issue in agricultural trade
because more than 50% of the spring wheat produced in the United States is exported and about
47% of current spring wheat exports are to countries which have stated that they will not accept
GM wheat. 
Most previous studies assume that the handling/transportation system will not be able to
develop an affordable and effective system to segregate wheat, but this study assumes that the
handling/transportation system may be able to segregate GM wheat.  A scenario is also run under
the assumption that the handling/transportation system will not be able to segregate GM wheat.
Under most scenarios, if segregation is successful, there is little change in export volume. 
When GM wheat is produced, export volumes increase slightly for North Dakota and other
spring wheat producing regions.  Winter wheat and Canadian producing regions export slightly
less wheat when GM wheat is produced in the United States. 
The scenarios which, if segregation is successful, allow Canadian producers to produce
GM wheat are similar to the scenarios for U.S. production.  Canadian exports of wheat increase
slightly under the scenarios.  The winter wheat region in the United States loses exports. 
Under an equilibrium condition, the price of GM wheat should fall by the production cost
savings less the segregation fee and the amount of default on the export loans.  In most cases,
GM wheat is priced about $2.10 to $2.15 per metric ton less than non-GM wheat.  Producer
welfare increases by $2.50 per metric ton, assuming that successful segregation is achieved for
$2.33 per metric ton, that there is a $2 cost advantage of raising GM wheat, and that 76% of
North Dakota spring wheat and 100% of other U.S. spring wheat production is GM.  If yields of
GM wheat are increased by 10%, producer welfare increases by $19.28 per metric ton for GM
wheat regions.  If GM wheat is 30% of spring wheat production, there is little or no gain in
producer welfare, again, assuming segregation is successful.
When segregation is unsuccessful, producer welfare in the United States drops by $10.56
per metric ton, or about $0.29 per bushel for spring wheat and $0.30 per bushel for winter wheat.
Producer welfare for Canadian producers increases $16.53 per metric ton, or about $0.45 per
bushel, because Canada exports non-GM wheat to Japan, S. Korea, and the EU.  The study did
not consider the impact on producers of durum wheat if segregation is unsuccessful.
When GM wheat is introduced, Japan, the EU, and S. Korea import wheat from either
Canada or segregated non-GM winter wheat from regions of the United States.  If the U.S.
marketing/transportation system is unable to develop an affordable and dependable segregation
system, these countries import wheat from Canada and other non-GM wheat producing
countries.*Richard Taylor is a Research Scientist, and Won W. Koo is Professor and Director, for the
Center for Agricultural Policy and Trade Studies, NDSU.  Eric DeVuyst is an Associate Professor in
Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics, NDSU.
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INTRODUCTION
The potential introduction of Genetically Modified (GM) wheat has been in the news for
several years.  This publicity is in contrast to the attention given to the introduction of other GM
crops, such as soybeans and corn, which were introduced several years ago.  Currently,
Monsanto is expected to introduce a glyphosate-tolerant spring wheat variety in the next two to
five years.   Because of consumer concern over the safety of the product, acceptance in overseas
markets is questionable.  Foreign market acceptance is an especially important issue in
agricultural trade because more than 50% of the spring wheat produced in the United States is
exported and about 47% of current spring wheat exports are to countries which have stated that
they will not accept GM wheat.  These countries include Japan, the European Union (EU),  and
S. Korea.  Many other countries have not made definite decisions concerning GM wheat. 
Consumer response to GM foods is influenced by perception of benefits and risks of GM food
and by confidence or trust in government regulatory systems charged with risk assessment and
management (Wilson et al.).   Science has not shown that GM foods are unsafe, but at the same
time, has not convinced the consuming public in some countries that GM foods are safe.  The
discussion involving the safety and feasibility of GM foods has left the area of economics and
science and has entered the arena of political and emotional debate.  
The current genetic trait to be introduced into the wheat variety is resistance to
glyphosate herbicide.  Glyphosate-tolerant soybeans have gained popularity with producers for
several reasons.  With glyphosate-tolerent crops, timing of the application of the glyphosate
herbicide is not critical and the producer has more time to spray for post-emergent weeds.  The
fields are generally cleaner for the next year’s crop and there is little carry-over, which allows
for a flexible crop rotation.  The herbicide cost for glyphosate-tolerant crops is generally less
than conventional herbicides.  Finally, there is little herbicide damage to the crop, thereby
increasing potential yields.  Currently in the United States, 9% of the corn and 75% of soybean
plantings are glyphosate-tolerant (USDA).  The main drawbacks for glyphosate-tolerant crops
are the potential development of glyphosate-resistant weed varieties and the difficulty of
controlling the volunteer crop the following year.  Current benefits of GM crops are directed
toward producers (Janzen et al.), but future strains of GM crops may include qualities which
consumers desire.
Wheat is unique when compared to either corn or soybeans.  Both corn and soybeans are
generally removed from human consumption by many steps and processes.  Corn is mainly fed
to livestock, and soybeans are processed into soybean oil and meal before consumption.  By2
contrast, wheat is ground into flour and directly consumed in breads, cakes, and other bakery
products.  In many countries, wheat is a staple food and a main source of nutrition.
Agriculture is in an age where more and more commodities contain specific attributes
and are being produced for specific end-uses.  Current GM technology directs its advantages
mainly toward crop producers.  Therefore, there is little reason for consumers to accept
something new and unknown.  This is problematic because today, more than ever, the consumer
drives the market.  Their tastes and preferences provide markets for products and return signals
indicating future wants.  Currently, consumers, especially in foreign markets, are rejecting GM
foods, which should provide a signal to the agricultural industry.
The objective of this study is to estimate the impact of the introduction of GM wheat on
the North Dakota wheat industry, other spring wheat regions both in the United States and
Canada, and the hard red winter (HRW) wheat growing regions.  Secondary objectives are to
estimate price of GM wheat, show trade flow changes and levels, and estimate changes in
consumer benefits.
The United States and Canada export hard red spring (HRS) wheats.  The two countries
produce similar types of HRS wheat, which are highly substitutable, and both export a large
portion of their production to world markets, in many cases to the same importers.  The United
States also produces HRW wheat, which is a close substitute of HRS and Canadian Western Red
Spring (CWRS) wheat.
Furtan et al. (2002) developed a model based on four groups of markets: the United
States domestic market, the Canadian domestic market, foreign markets that accept both GM and
non-GM wheat, and foreign markets that will accept only non-GM wheat.  They assumed that
the U.S. and Canadian domestic markets accept GM and non-GM wheat as perfect substitutes.  
Furtan et al. found that if the United States were to license GM wheat first among the
countries, the U.S. producer price would decrease from $C152.42 per metric ton to $C142.49 per
metric ton, which is a difference of $C9.93 per metric ton, or $C0.27 per bushel.  This price
reduction would occur because the United States could no longer export wheat to countries that
do not accept the GM wheat, allowing Canada and other competitors to fill the gaps in these
markets.  If both the United States and Canada licensed GM wheat, the researchers found that
producer prices in the United States would decrease even further.  This would occur because
after licensing the GM variety, Canada would likely increase exports across the border, since the
United States accepts GM wheat, which would cause U.S. domestic prices to fall further.  If 
both Canada and the United States introduced GM wheat, the researchers estimate that the
reduction in wheat prices would equal $C0.76 per bushel in the United States and $C0.81 per
bushel in Canada.  In another study, Kuntz (2001) estimated that the annual average price of
CWRS wheat across all qualities of wheat would decrease $C13.95 per metric ton ($C0.38 per
bushel), and that the annual average revenue to the pool account for CWRS wheat would
decrease about $C185 million, if GM wheat was introduced in Canada.
The results from Furtan et al. are based on the assumption that the United States and
Canada will not have an affordable system to segregate GM and non-GM wheat.  The3
researchers believe that this is likely since the very low tolerance levels in a number of wheat-
importing countries would make effective segregation costly.  Furtan et al. assumed that if either
the United States or Canada licenses GM wheat, importing countries will assume that all wheat
produced in the United States or Canada contains some GM product because of the inability to
distinguish between GM and non-GM wheat.  Therefore, if either country licenses GM wheat,
they will lose markets.  
Reports from the U.S. Wheat Associates (April 2001 and 2002) confirm these
assumptions.  Representatives of the U.S. wheat industry traveled to Japan in April 2001 to
discuss implications of GM wheat with Japan’s industry leaders.  They found that there was no
market or consumer acceptance for GM wheat.  The Japanese industry leaders indicated that they
would purchase non-GM wheat from U.S. competitors if the United States could not guarantee
that its wheat was GM-free.  U.S. Wheat Associates reported that the development of an identity-
preserved (IP) system is not enough to protect U.S. market share in Japan since the Japanese are
skeptical of the reliability of any IP system.  The view of the millers in Japan was that consumers
would not purchase wheat products, even those labeled as “non-GM” or “segregated,” for fear of
contamination, and that consumers would readily shift from wheat to rice (U.S. Wheat
Associates 2001).  
U.S. Wheat Associates (2002) has reported similar views in Europe.  Some of the largest
buyers in the region stated that they will not buy U.S. wheat if GM wheat is produced in the
United States because 1) consumers have strong opinions against GM foods, 2) they can buy
cheap alternative supplies from other countries, and 3) they are skeptical of the ability to
segregate GM from non-GM wheat (U.S. Wheat Associates 2002).
Another potential impact of GM HRS wheat introduction is the effect on durum wheat
exports.  The CEO of the largest wheat miller in Italy, Grandi Molini Italiani, stated that if the
United States allows commercial production of GM wheat varieties, they will be forced to avoid
importing from any wheat region in the United States. (Reuters News Service).   
Other GM crops and foreign acceptance of them may provide information concerning
future acceptance of GM wheat.  The EU was a major importer of canola meal and honey from
Canada.  After the introduction of GM canola, exports of both fell to almost zero (Calgary
Herald).  Also, U.S. corn exports to the EU and S. Korea have fallen substantially since the
introduction of GM corn.  U.S. soybean meal exports to the EU have also fallen since the
introduction of GM soybeans in the United States (USDA).
Because of consumer resistance and the lack of a credible segregation system, Furtan et
al. found that there is no first-mover advantage in producing GM wheat.  They found that
benefits would transfer from wheat producers to biotech firms.  The cost savings assumed from
producing GM wheat is not nearly enough to overcome the reduced price caused by lost export
sales.
Consumer confidence in government oversight is generally low in foreign countries.
Previous experiences with food related health problems, for example mad-cow disease, have
developed public mistrust in regulatory and other governmental agencies.4
The handling/transportation system, in the future, may develop a system which is
affordable and dependable, although past experience indicates that it will be very difficult, (e.g.
Starlink® corn).  Currently, that system is not available.  Whether GM or non-GM wheat would
be segregated is unknown at this time.  The type of wheat to which the cost of segregation is
applied depends mainly on the volume handled.  If GM wheat is a minor crop, the cost of
segregation will be directed toward GM wheat.  On the other hand, if GM wheat becomes the
dominant type produced, non-GM wheat will be segregated.
Farmers are not expected to plant 100% GM wheat.  The adoption level of GM wheat is
currently unknown.  Each producer will estimate, for his own operation, costs and benefits of
GM wheat production.  GM wheat will be produced only if both the monetary and gains in terms
of convenience exceed additional costs.  Also, there is a crop rotation issue.  Typically,
producers will not produce glyphosate-tolerant wheat after glyphosate-tolerant soybeans, canola,
or corn because of the cost to control volunteer crops and the increased potential for weeds to
develop tolerance to glyphosate.  Another factor limiting the adoption of glyphosate-tolerant
wheat is that the common practice of applying glyphosate to dry wheat prior to harvest would
become ineffective.  
The next section of the paper develops a spatial equilibrium model to evaluate the trade
impacts of the introduction of GM wheat.  Following sections describe the data used for the
analysis and the assumptions and scenarios used in the model.  The results and conclusions are
presented in subsequent sections.
METHODOLOGY
A spatial equilibrium model is developed to evaluate the trade impacts associated with
GM wheat introduction and several plausible post-GM adoption scenarios.  HRS, CWRS, and
HRW wheat are modeled.  HRS wheat is further divided into non-GM and GM variants. 
Substitution between spring and winter wheat is allowed by converting wheat into protein
equivalents.  HRS and CWRS wheat are assumed to contain 14% protein and HRW wheat is
assumed to contain 12% protein.  Both supply and demand for wheat are expressed in terms of
1,000 metric tons of protein.  Results are then converted back to 1,000 metric tons of wheat for
exposition.
The United States is divided into three producing regions: North Dakota, other spring
wheat producing states, and a winter wheat growing region.  Canada is divided into the four
western provinces: Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia.  The model also
includes 26 countries which, together, import over 90% of the hard wheat produced by the
United States and Canada, and a rest of the world region.
The objective function of the model is to maximize total consumer and producer surplus
less transportation costs.  As the model is an implicit price model, we sum the integrated inverse
demand functions and quantity consumed in all importing countries, subtract the sum of the
integrated inverse supply functions and quantity produced in all exporting countries, and the sum
of transportation costs from producing regions to consuming regions plus cost saving for the






i = subscript denoting hard red wheat consuming region;
j = subscript denoting hard red wheat producing region;
ai = intercept term of import demand equation for region i;
bi = price coefficient of import demand equation for region i;
ej = intercept term of export supply equation for region j;
fj = price coefficient of export supply equation for region j;
= export supply from region j;
= import demand from region i;
= transportation cost from producing region j to consuming region i.
and  = quantity of non-GM and GM protein produced in region j;
and  = quantity of non-GM and GM protein consumed in region i;
= production cost savings for GM wheat production.
The first term is the sum of consumer surplus in all importing countries, the second term
represents the sum of producer surplus in all exporting countries, the third term is the sum of all
transportation costs in shipping both GM and non-GM wheat from exporting countries to
importing countries, and the fourth term is the cost savings of producing GM wheat.
Balance constraints are imposed to equate supply and demand for both GM and non-GM
wheat.
And, total production and consumption are computed in (3) and (4):
As price is implicit in this model formulation, prices paid and received must be imputed
as the inverse of the demand and supply functions, both evaluated post-optimality.
Export commodity loan losses are computed after each scenario is calculated.  As much
of current U.S. sales of grain are to “cash” customers (EU, Japan, and S.Korea), GM adoption by
U.S. producers may shift sales to “credit” customers, some of whom may default on the loans. 6
These expected loan losses are computed prior to GM adoption and post-GM adoption. 
Estimates on the likelihood and severity of default are taken from Diersen and Sherrick (2000). 
For several countries in our model, Diersen and Sherrick (2000) do not provide estimates of
default.  In these cases, averages from the developing countries are used.
DATA
Table 1 shows the average chemical cost in North Dakota and other spring wheat
producing states.  The eastern part of North Dakota has the highest costs of $11.50 per acre,
whereas the western part of North Dakota has the lowest cost.  The other spring wheat growing
states were assumed to have similar chemical costs as North Dakota, i.e., Minnesota at
$11.50/acre, South Dakota at $9.90/acre, and Montana at $8.70/acre.  The cost for an application
of glyphosate is assumed to be about $4.50 to $5.00/ acre.  Average potential cost savings could
be as large as $7.00 per acre in the eastern part of the region.  The chemical costs for many
producers are much higher than the average of $11.50. 





Source: North Dakota Extension Service
GM wheat varieties will carry a technology fee (tech fee), which is charged by the seed
company.  The tech fee for glyphosate-tolerant wheat is unannounced, but for corn and soybeans
it is in the $5.00 to $8.00/acre range (Abraham) and for canola it is about $11/acre.  Herbicide
costs for corn and soybeans are typically higher than those for wheat, in the range of $18.00 to
$25.00/acre, so the cost savings potential is larger for corn and soybeans than for wheat.  The
lower cost savings for wheat limits the tech fee which can be charged by the seed company.  The
tech fee used in this study is assumed to be $4.00 per acre.  The level of the tech fee is not
critical to the results, as explained in the Assumption section below.
Table 2 shows the current trade flows for U.S. and Canadian hard wheat.  The United
States exports 5.47 million metric tons of HRS and 8.62 million metric tons of HRW wheat.  The
largest importer of HRS wheat is Japan at 1.34 million metric tons, followed by the EU and the
Philippines.  The largest importer of HRW wheat is Nicaragua at 1.68 million metric tons,
followed by Egypt and Mexico.  The largest importer of CWRS is Iran at 3.49 million metric
tons, followed by Japan and the United States.  
We hypothesize that wheat flows should shift when GM wheat is introduced into
production.  According to our model assumptions, U.S. HRS wheat exports to Japan, S. Korea,
and the EU are expected to be partially or totally replaced by exports from Canada.  The markets
formerly served by Canadian exports would be switched to U.S. wheat.  If GM spring wheat is
produced in both the U.S. and Canada, segregated non-GM HRW could be a substitute for spring
wheat.  There are several countries with which the United States will not trade (Iran, Iraq, and7
North Korea), but there is sufficient global import demand for hard wheat to provide markets for
GM wheat.  
Table 2. Current United States and Canadian Exports of Hard Wheat
US-HRS US-HRW CAN-CWRS Total
-------------------------1000 metric tons-------------------------
Bangladesh 0 0 243 243
Chile 0 4 201 205
China 175 0 661 836
Colombia 0 362 405 767
D. Republic 113 91 19 223
Ecuador 26 6 270 302
Egypt 27 1,526 99 1,652
EU 889 0 968 1,857
Guatemala 36 61 278 375
Indonesia 29 5 693 727
Iran 0 0 3,492 3,492
Iraq 0 0 262 262
Israel 4 562 0 566
Japan 1,343 981 1,242 3,566
Jordan 0 308 5 313
S. Korea 349 270 138 757
Malaysia 146 4 285 435
Mexico 95 1,182 577 1,854
Nicaragua 49 1,682 0 1,731
Peru 0 422 224 646
Philippines 700 3 436 1,139
S. Lanka 52 204 256
Taiwan 533 283 36 852
Thailand 163 65 171 399
UAE 36 32 312 380
US 0 0 1,128 1,128
Venezuela 113 127 482 722
Rest of World 640 596 1,466 2,702
Total 5,466 8,624 14,297 28,387
Source: USDA and Canada Grains Council
Production data for the regions in the United States are obtained from the USDA and data
for Canada are obtained from the Canada Grains Council.  A three-year average is used to lessen
weather abnormalities.  Current exports are obtained from the same sources.  Table 3 shows the
production and exportable supply of hard wheat by region.  The domestic consumption of hard8
wheat for the United States and Canada is removed from the total supply to calculate exportable
supply.  Saskatchewan is the largest producer of spring wheat, followed by other spring wheat
growing regions in the United States and Alberta.  Winter wheat is grown only in the winter
wheat region.
Table 3. Total Production and Exportable Supply of Hard Wheats
Production Exportable Supply
HRS HRW HRS HRW
-----------------1000 metric tons---------------
Manitoba 3928.0 0.0 1964.0 0.0
Saskatchewan 11267.4 0.0 5633.7 0.0
Alberta 6303.0 0.0 3151.5 0.0
British Columbia 100.4 0.0 50.2 0.0
North Dakota 5559.3 0.0 2779.7 0.0
Other Spring 6575.9 0.0 3288.0 0.0
Winter 0.0 25196.7 12598.4
Total 58930.7 29465.4
Source: USDA, Canada Grains Council
Table 4 shows the average prices received by farmers and market prices for hard wheat in
Canada and the United States during the past three years.  U.S. prices were obtained from the
USDA and prices received by farmers in Canada were obtained from the annual reports of the
Canadian Wheat Board.  
Table 4. Prices Received By Farmers and Market Prices
for Hard Red Spring and Hard Red Winter Wheat, 






Source: USDA, Canadian Wheat Board
Table 5 shows the estimated import demand elasticities for the importing countries.  The
elasticities were adapted for the model (Koo and Taylor).  Import demand is inelastic in most
countries, indicating that a change in price will have little impact on the level of imports.
Hard red wheat (protein) import demand equations are derived for 27 regions using
elasticity estimates, historical price data, and historical consumption data (USDA).  Again, all
quantities and prices are converted into their protein equivalents to allow substitution between




=price paid by consuming region i.
Calibrated demand equation parameters are reported in Table 5.









Bangladesh -0.02 34.700 -5.038e-7 Jordan -0.02 38.413 -5.503e-7
Chile -0.3 37.206 -6.541e-6 Malaysia -0.492 67.510 -5.018e-6
China -0.016 118.854 -1.416e-6 Mexico -0.11 306.696 -5.714e-5
Colombia -0.3 130.182 -2.328e-5 Nicaragua -0.3 271.310 -4.922e-5
D. Republic -0.3 38.220 -6.934e-6 Peru -0.3 106.600 -1.915e-5
Ecuador -0.3 54.808 -9.899e-6 Philippines -0.3 176.934 -1.34e-5
Egypt -0.001 200.991 -1.562e-7 S. Korea -0.11 150.065 -3.864e-5
EU -0.012 263.022 -2.387e-6 S. Lanka -0.02 35.496 -4.990e-7
Guatemala -0.3 66.664 -1.210e-5 Taiwan -0.021 116.006 -1.844e-6
Indonesia -0.11 112.865 -8.271e-6 Thailand -0.11 60.562 -4.581e-6
Iran -0.02 498.402 -6.989e-6 UAE -0.02 53.611 -7.514e-7
Iraq -0.02 37.414 -5.244e-7 U.S. -0.5 236.880 -6.985e-5
Israel -0.02 69.360 -9.936e-7 Venezuela -0.291 127.215 -2.264e-5
Japan -0.006 482.402 -2.147e-6 ROW -0.02 373.687 -5.702e-6
Source: Global Wheat Policy Simulation Model
Table 6 shows the export supply elasticities for the United States and Canada.  The
export supplies for all wheat classes are relatively inelastic, indicating that a change in prices
will have a small impact on export supply.
Export supply equations are developed for seven North American hard wheat producing
regions.  CWRS wheat producing regions are Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, and
Saskatchewan.  HRS wheat producing regions are North Dakota and other U.S. spring wheat
producing states.  U.S. HRW wheat producing regions are aggregated into one region.  These
protein export supply equations take the form of:
where
=price received by producing region j.10
Supply equation parameters are calibrated to historical exports measured in 1,000 metric tons of
protein and historical prices received for wheat again in protein equivalents.  Elasticity estimates
are obtained from the Global Wheat Policy Simulation Model (Taylor and Koo).  The resulting
export supply equation parameters are reported in Table 6.
Table 6. Calibrated Protein Export Supply Equation Parameters
Region Elasticity Intercept ej Price
coefficient fj
Alberta 0.31 280.557 1.537e-6
British Columbia 0.31 4.451 2.439e-9
Manitoba 0.31 174.871 9.580e-5
Saskatchewan 0.31 501.530 2.748e-4







Shipping rates for U.S. wheat are calculated from U.S. Waybill data for rail shipments
and from the American Marketing Service (AMS website) for barge shipments.  Canadian
shipping rates are obtained from published rates by the Canadian National Railways.  Ocean
shipping rates are adapted from rates obtained from Richardson Lawrie Associates (RLA).  The
shipping matrix between exporters and importers is developed utilizing a least-cost
transportation method.  Transportation costs were calculated for each origin-destination route,
and the least-cost route was chosen.  The transportation matrix is shown in Appendix Table 1.
Many importing countries or companies utilize credit for the purchase of imported goods. 
 These countries or firms may potentially default on all or part of the loan.  The developed
countries of Japan, the EU, Israel, China, Canada, and Taiwan do not present that risk.  Data
from Dierson and Sherrick (2000)  indicate the default risk and the severity of a default (see
Table 7). In most cases, the potential financial risk is very small.  Jordan, for example, runs a
7.1% risk of defaulting on a loan, but the severity of the default is 0.2% of the total loan value,
for a financial loss of 0.014% of the value of the loan.  Egypt has a 5.4% chance of defaulting on
a loan, but the severity is 0.4%, for a financial loss of 0.022%.  The risk in most cases is $0.02 to
$0.03 per metric ton. 11
































Source: Dierson and Sherrick
ASSUMPTIONS AND SCENARIO DESCRIPTIONS
Eleven scenarios are evaluated in this study.  Table 8 explains the various scenarios.  A
baseline scenario is developed with which to compare all other scenarios.  Even though current
production costs for glyphosate-tolerant soybeans are higher than non-GM soybeans, 75% of the
soybean production in the United States consists of GM soybeans.  The convenience of weed12
control must provide the incentive to produce GM soybeans.  For this study, to bring GM wheat
into the solution, production costs are assumed to be $2 per acre less than for non-GM wheat,
which may be considered a convenience value.  Scenario 1 assumes that the U.S.
marketing/transportation system will not be able to develop an affordable and reliable method of
segregation.  Therefore, under scenario 1, the EU, Japan, and S. Korea will not purchase any
wheat from the United States.  Only one scenario was reported with unsuccessful segregation
because no combination of the other assumptions provided positive results.  Scenario 2 allows
for the production of GM wheat in both North Dakota (ND) and other spring wheat (OSR)
growing regions of the United States with successful segregation.  Yields are assumed to be
equal in all scenarios except for 5, 8, and 10.  These scenarios allow for a 10%  increase in
yields.  Agronomically, glyphosate-tolerant wheat is similar to other varieties except for the
glyphosate-resistant gene.  Yield potential and other agronomic factors within the seed are
similar, so any yield increases will be a result of less chemical damage and less weed
competition, although this has not been documented with soybeans. 
The three countries/regions which will not accept GM wheat are Japan, the EU, and S.
Korea; these countries together import 2.58 million metric tons of HRS wheat, 1.25 million
metric tons of HRW, and 1.66 million metric tons of CWRS wheat.  If the United States
produces GM spring wheat, those markets will transfer to CWRS or U.S. non-GM segregated
HRW wheat.  There is concern that the U.S. marketing system will not be able to segregate GM
wheat from non-GM wheat regardless of the class.  For this study, an assumption was made both
ways.  For scenarios 2 through 10, it was assumed that a segregation system could be developed. 
However, for scenario 1, it is assumed that the U.S. marketing system will not be able to
segregate GM from non-GM wheat.  A segregation fee of $2.23/metric ton is applied to non-GM
wheat exported to Japan, the EU, and S. Korea.  There has been a wide debate on what that cost
would be.   Estimates range from $1.30 per metric ton to over $16 per metric ton depending on
what is included in the cost, i.e., segregation, sampling, testing (both domestically and foreign),
reporting, and insurance (Wisner).  If a segregation system is not affordable, GM wheat
production will not be profitable.  Therefore, a level was chosen that could provide separation
but at the same time not prevent GM wheat production.
Scenario 3 prevents GM wheat production in North Dakota.  All other factors remain
constant.  The scenario evaluates the impact on North Dakota if the state government prevents
GM wheat production in North Dakota.  Scenario 4 allows GM wheat production in ND and
OSR but only at the 30% adoption level.  Many producers within the production regions,
especially in the western areas, may not produce GM wheat because their herbicide cost is less
than the cost for GM wheat.  Also, rotational concerns will affect the production of a second GM
crop.  Scenario 5 allows GM wheat production in ND and OSR but with a 10% yield increase
over non-GM wheat.   Monsanto has indicated that a 10-15% yield increase is possible because
of less weed competition and less crop herbicide damage.  Scenario 6 allows GM wheat
production in both the United States and Canada.  Scenario 7 allows GM wheat production in
both but at the 30% adoption level.  Likewise, scenario 8 allows for a 10% yield increase for GM
wheat in the two countries.  At this time, it is unknown whether GM wheat will be segregated
from non-GM wheat or non-GM will be segregated from GM wheat.  Scenarios 9 and 10 place
the segregation fee on GM wheat instead of on non-GM wheat.  If the marketing system in the13
United States treats GM wheat as a minor commodity, it is possible that GM wheat will carry the
segregation cost instead of non-GM wheat.
Table 8. Explanation of the Various GM Wheat Scenarios Considered in the Study
Baseline Wheat flows with no GM wheat produced
Scenario 1 GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR, no wheat trade with the
EU, Japan, or S. Korea 
Scenario 2  GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR
Scenario 3  GM wheat production allowed in only OSR
Scenario 4  GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30% adoption level
Scenario 5 GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR but with a 10% yield
increase
Scenario 6 GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of the U.S.
and Canada
Scenario 7 GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of the U.S.
and Canada at the 30% adoption level
Scenario 8 GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of U.S. and
Canada but with a 10% yield increase
Scenario 9 GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30% adoption level
and the segregation fee applied to GM wheat
Scenario 10 GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR but with a 10% yield
increase and the segregation fee applied to GM wheat
RESULTS
Export Volume
Table 9 shows the exports of hard wheat under the various scenarios.  Under most
scenarios, there is little change in export volume, if segregation is successful.  The results change
if the U.S. marketing/transportation system is unable to segregate GM wheat from non-GM
wheat (scenario 1).  North Dakota’s exports are reduced 2.1% (7,460 metric tons), other spring
wheat region exports are reduced 2.0% (8,830 metric tons), and the winter wheat region exports
are reduced 2.2%.  Canadian exports increase 4.4%.  When GM wheat is produced with
successful segregation (scenario 2), export volumes increase slightly for the producing regions of
ND and OSR.  The other producing regions export slightly less wheat under scenario 2.  Total
trade volume increases by 1,770 metric tons, or 0.04%.  When North Dakota is prevented from
producing GM wheat (scenario 3), wheat exports from North Dakota decrease slightly along
with the other non-GM wheat producing regions.  Export volume for OSR increases by 2,090
metric tons.  When the adoption rate for GM wheat is limited to 30%, ND and OSR increase
their exports, but at lower levels than those under scenario 2.  If the yield for GM wheat is
increased 10% (scenario 5), production increases  by 13,640 metric tons for ND and 16,12014
metric tons for OSR.  Total exports increase by 9,440 metric tons.  Other non-GM wheat
producing regions lose exports.   
The scenarios which allow Canadian producers to produce GM wheat (scenarios 6, 7, and
8) are similar to the scenarios for U.S. production.  Canadian exports of wheat increase slightly
under these scenarios.  The winter wheat region in the United States loses exports.  If the
segregation fee is applied to GM wheat, there is little or no change in export levels.  
Table 9. Exports of Hard Wheat By Region Under Various Scenarios
ND OSR WR Man SK Alb BC Total
-----------------------------------1000 metric tons---------------------------------------
Baseline 365.82 432.66 1652.27 264.67 736.47 418.05 6.64 3876.58
1 358.36 423.83 1616.30 275.98 768.91 436.20 6.93 3886.51
2 367.59 434.75 1651.39 264.45 735.84 417.70 6.63 3878.35
3 365.58 436.09 1651.32 264.43 735.79 417.68 6.63 3877.52
4 366.32 433.23 1651.99 264.60 736.28 417.92 6.64 3876.98
5 379.46 448.78 1643.63 262.55 730.37 414.65 6.58 3886.02
6 367.51 434.65 1651.04 264.94 737.24 418.49 6.64 3880.51
7 365.78 432.61 1652.12 264.63 736.35 417.99 6.64 3876.12
8 376.13 444.86 1630.53 269.70 750.89 426.12 6.77 3905.00
9 365.83 432.66 1652.28 264.67 736.47 418.06 6.64 3876.61
10 365.83 432.66 1652.28 264.67 736.47 418.06 6.64 3876.61
Difference
1 -7.46 -8.83 -35.97 11.31 32.44 18.15 0.29 9.93
2 1.77 2.09 -0.88 -0.22 -0.63 -0.35 -0.01 1.77
3 -0.24 3.43 -0.95 -0.24 -0.68 -0.37 -0.01 0.94
4 0.50 0.57 -0.28 -0.07 -0.19 -0.13 -0.00 0.40
5 13.64 16.12 -8.64 -2.12 -6.10 -3.40 -0.06 9.44
6 1.69 1.99 -1.23 0.27 0.77 0.44 0.00 3.93
7 -0.04 -0.05 -0.15 -0.04 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 -0.46
8 10.31 12.20 -21.74 5.03 14.42 8.07 0.13 28.42
9 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03
10 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03
Baseline) Current wheat flows;  Scenario 1) GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR, no wheat trade with
the EU, Japan, or S. Korea;  2) GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat regions; 3) GM wheat production
allowed in only region OSR; 4) GM wheat  production allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30% adoption level; 5) GM
wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR but with a 10% yield increase; 6) GM wheat  production allowed in all
spring wheat growing regions of both countries; 7) GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of
both countries at the 30% adoption level; 8) GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of both
countries with a 10% yield increase;  9) GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30% adoption level
and the segregation fee is applied to GM wheat; 10) GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR with a 10%
yield increase and the segregation fee is applied to GM wheat.15
Adoption
Table 10 shows the GM wheat production shares for the various scenarios.  Under
scenario 1, both spring wheat growing regions in the United States produce 100% GM wheat.
When GM wheat is produced and segregated, all of the wheat produced in OSR is GM wheat
and almost 76% of the wheat produced in ND is GM wheat.  When yields are increased 10%, all
of the spring wheat produced in ND and OSR is GM wheat.  Canada produces 80.9% GM wheat
when they are not restricted in GM output.  If the segregation fee is placed on GM (scenario 10)
and yields are increased, GM wheat production in ND is 48.1% of the total wheat produced,
OSR produces 46.8% GM wheat, and Canada produces 100% GM wheat.  
Table 10. GM Wheat Production Shares By Region Under Various Scenarios
Scenarios 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
------------------------------------------percent------------------------------------------------
ND 100.0 75.9 0.0 30.0 100.0 100.0 30.0 99.0 30.0 48.1
OSR 100.0 100.0 100.0 30.0 100.0 88.1 30.0 100.0 30.0 46.8
Canada 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 80.9 30.0 100.0 30.0 100.0
Scenario 1) GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR, no wheat trade with the EU, Japan, or S. Korea;  2) GM
wheat production allowed in all spring wheat regions; 3) GM wheat production allowed in only region OSR; 4) GM wheat 
production allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30% adoption level; 5) GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and
OSR but with a 10% yield increase; 6) GM wheat  production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of both countries;
7) GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of both countries at the 30% adoption level; 8) GM
wheat production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of both countries with a 10% yield increase;  9) GM wheat
production allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30% adoption level and the segregation fee is applied to GM wheat; 10)
GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR with a 10% yield increase and the segregation fee is applied to GM
wheat.
Producer and Consumer Welfare
Table 11 shows the total producer welfare under the various scenarios.  Producer welfare
drops for the spring wheat growing region under scenario 1.  When no trade is allowed with the
EU, Japan, or S. Korea, because of unsuccessful segregation, producer welfare for North Dakota
drops $27.3 million (10.1%).  In the OSR, the producer welfare under this scenario drops $32.3
million (10.1%).  The winter wheat region also loses producer welfare because HRW wheat is
viewed as being mixed with GM spring wheat.  The producer welfare for the winter wheat region
drops $150.7 million (12.0%).  The percentage drop for the winter wheat region is larger because
the growers do not have the advantage of lower production costs.  Producer welfare for the
Canadian growers increases $171.2 million (16.7%).
 When GM wheat is allowed, and segregation is successful, North Dakota’s producer
welfare increases by $6.55 million and the producer welfare for the OSR increases by $7.74
million.  The other regions lose producer welfare.  When North Dakota is prevented from
growing GM wheat, producer welfare decreases by $910,000.  If yields are increased 10%,
producer welfare increases $51.32 million in North Dakota and $60.69 million in the OSR. 
Producer welfare in the winter wheat region in the United States and Canada falls $36.54 million
and $31.33 million, respectively.  If GM wheat is also grown in Canada, producer welfare in
Canada increases by $4.01 million.  When yields are increased 10%, producer welfare increases
$75.23 million, or $19.28 per bushel.  It remains relatively unchanged from the baseline when
the segregation fee is applied to GM wheat.  Producer welfare increases $2.50 per metric ton
when GM wheat is produced (Table 12), if segregation is successful.  If North Dakota is16
prevented from GM wheat production, the producer welfare decreases $0.35 per metric ton, but
it increases $4.11 per metric ton for OSR.  When GM wheat is grown in the United States and
Canada, producer welfare increases $0.40 per metric ton in Canada and $2.38 per metric ton in
the United States.  When the segregation fee is charged to GM wheat, there is no change from
the baseline in producer welfare.  Under scenario 1, producer welfare drops $10.56 per metric
ton, or about $0.29 per bushel for spring wheat and $0.30 per bushel for winter wheat, because of
the loss of all wheat trade with Japan, S. Korea, and the EU.  Producer welfare for Canadian
producers under this scenario increase $16.53 per metric ton, or about $0.45 per bushel.
Table 13 shows the total consumer welfare under the various scenarios.  Consumer
welfare  changes very little except under the two scenarios which allow for a yield increase;
however, even under these scenarios, the change is less than 0.1%.  Consumers do benefit from
GM wheat production, but the benefit is very small.17
Table 11. Total Producer Welfare Under Various Scenarios
ND OSR WR Man SK Alb BC
---------------------------------Million $------------------------------------
Baseline 270.48 319.90 1,259.97 206.01 529.30 312.48 4.97
1 243.17 287.59 1,109.32 237.93 618.18 362.92 5.77
2 277.03 327.64 1,256.19 205.40 527.61 311.53 4.96
3 269.58 332.64 1,255.88 205.35 527.48 311.45 4.95
4 272.51 322.30 1,258.08 205.70 528.51 312.02 4.97
5 321.80 380.59 1,223.43 200.16 513.04 303.25 4.82
6 276.71 327.26 1,254.73 206.76 531.38 313.67 4.99
7 270.33 319.71 1,259.26 205.89 528.98 312.30 4.97
8 309.12 365.59 1,168.47 220.04 568.34 334.64 5.32
9 270.49 319.91 1,260.01 206.01 529.32 312.50 4.97
10 270.49 319.91 1,260.01 206.01 529.32 312.50 4.97
Difference
1 -27.32 -32.31 -150.65 31.92 88.88 50.44 0.80
2 6.55 7.74 -3.78 -0.61 -1.69 -0.96 -0.02
3 -0.91 12.74 -4.09 -0.65 -1.82 -1.03 -0.02
4 2.03 2.40 -1.89 -0.31 -0.79 -0.47 0.00
5 51.32 60.69 -36.54 -5.84 -16.26 -9.23 -0.15
6 6.22 7.36 -5.24 0.75 2.08 1.18 0.02
7 -0.16 -0.19 -0.71 -0.11 -0.32 -0.18 -0.00
8 38.64 45.69 -91.50 14.03 39.04 22.16 0.35
9 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
10 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
Baseline) Baseline wheat flows;  Scenario 1) GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR, no wheat
trade with the EU, Japan, or S. Korea;  2) GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat regions; 3) GM
wheat production allowed in only region OSR; 4) GM wheat  production allowed in regions ND and OSR at
the 30% adoption level; 5) GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR but with a 10% yield
increase; 6) GM wheat  production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of both countries; 7) GM wheat
production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of both countries at the 30% adoption level; 8) GM
wheat production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of both countries with a 10% yield increase;  9)
GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30% adoption level and the segregation fee is
applied to GM wheat; 10) GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR with a 10% yield increase
and the segregation fee is applied to GM wheat.18
Table  12. Producer Welfare Per Metric Ton of Wheat Exported
ND OSR WR Man SK Alb BC
----------------------------------------$/metric ton------------------------------------------
Baseline 116.66 116.66 101.69 131.23 119.71 125.24 125.52
1 106.10 106.10 90.62 147.76 136.24 141.77 142.05
2 119.16 119.16 101.41 130.91 119.39 124.92 125.20
3 116.32 120.77 101.39 130.89 119.37 124.90 125.18
4 117.54 117.54 101.43 131.36 119.84 125.37 125.65
5 135.94 135.94 99.02 128.13 116.61 122.14 122.42
6 119.04 119.04 101.30 131.63 120.11 125.64 125.92
7 116.60 116.60 101.63 131.17 119.65 125.18 125.46
8 131.24 131.24 95.00 138.58 127.06 132.59 132.87
9 116.67 116.67 101.69 131.24 119.72 125.25 125.53
10 116.67 116.67 101.69 131.24 119.72 125.25 125.53
Difference
From Base
1 -10.56 -10.56 -11.06 16.53 16.53 16.53 16.53
2 2.50 2.50 -0.27 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32
3 -0.35 4.11 -0.30 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35
4 0.87 0.87 -0.25 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13
5 19.28 19.28 -2.66 -3.10 -3.10 -3.10 -3.10
6 2.38 2.38 -0.38 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
7 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
8 14.58 14.58 -6.69 7.35 7.35 7.35 7.35
9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Baseline) Baseline wheat flows;  Scenario 1) GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR, no wheat trade with the
EU, Japan, or S. Korea;  2) GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat regions; 3) GM wheat production allowed in
only region OSR; 4) GM wheat  production allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30% adoption level; 5) GM wheat
production allowed in regions ND and OSR but with a 10% yield increase; 6) GM wheat  production allowed in all spring
wheat growing regions of both countries; 7) GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of both
countries at the 30% adoption level; 8) GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of both countries
with a 10% yield increase;  9) GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30% adoption level and the
segregation fee is applied to GM wheat; 10) GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR with a 10% yield increase
and the segregation fee is applied to GM wheat.19
Table 13. Consumer Welfare Under Various Scenarios













Baseline) Baseline wheat flows;  Scenario 1) GM wheat production
allowed in regions ND and OSR, no wheat trade with the EU, Japan, or
S. Korea;  2) GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat regions;
3) GM wheat production allowed in only region OSR; 4) GM wheat 
production allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30% adoption level; 5)
GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR but with a 10%
yield increase; 6) GM wheat  production allowed in all spring wheat
growing regions of both countries; 7) GM wheat production allowed in
all spring wheat growing regions of both countries at the 30% adoption
level; 8) GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat growing
regions of both countries with a 10% yield increase;  9) GM wheat
production allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30% adoption level
and the segregation fee is applied to GM wheat; 10) GM wheat
production allowed in regions ND and OSR with a 10% yield increase
and the segregation fee is applied to GM wheat.
Table 14 shows the total welfare for the system under the various scenarios.  Total
welfare changes very little.  In the scenarios which allow for the yield to increase, total welfare
increases $135.3 million when U.S. production of GM wheat is allowed and $356.2 million
when both US and Canadian production is allowed.  The increases are 0.05% and 0.14%,
respectively.  Under scenario 1, total welfare is reduced with the introduction of GM wheat in
the United States because of the loss of hard wheat exports.  20
Table 14. Total Welfare For the System Under Various Scenarios













Baseline) Baseline wheat flows;  Scenario 1) GM wheat production allowed in regions
ND and OSR, no wheat trade with the EU, Japan, or S. Korea;  2) GM wheat
production allowed in all spring wheat regions; 3) GM wheat production allowed in
only region OSR; 4) GM wheat  production allowed in regions ND and OSR at the
30% adoption level; 5) GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR but with
a 10% yield increase; 6) GM wheat  production allowed in all spring wheat growing
regions of both countries; 7) GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat growing
regions of both countries at the 30% adoption level; 8) GM wheat production allowed
in all spring wheat growing regions of both countries with a 10% yield increase;  9)
GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30% adoption level and
the segregation fee is applied to GM wheat; 10) GM wheat production allowed in
regions ND and OSR with a 10% yield increase and the segregation fee is applied to
GM wheat.
Prices
Table 15 shows the estimated prices for GM and non-GM wheat and the differences
between the prices.  Under an equilibrium system, the price of GM wheat should fall by the
production cost savings less the segregation fee and the amount of default on the loans.  In most
cases, GM wheat is about $2.10 to $2.15 per metric ton less than non-GM wheat.  The reason
that the price difference under the ND scenario is $0.55 is that North Dakota cannot produce GM
wheat, which restricts the supply of GM wheat.  The price difference under the two scenarios
which place the segregation fee on GM wheat (9 and 10) is approximately $4.15 per metric ton,
which reflects the $2.33 per metric ton segregation fee.  Under scenario 1, the price drops $10.56
per metric ton, or about $0.29 per bushel, in the United States with unsuccessful segregation.
Imports and Trade Flows
Table 16 shows imports of wheat under various scenarios.  The level of imports does not
change very much.  The only change that occurs is under the two scenarios in which yields are
increased by 10%.  Imports increase by 72,000 metric tons when U.S. GM wheat yields are
increased and by 218,000 metric tons when both U.S. and Canadian GM wheat yields are
increased.  Under these two scenarios, there is a price decrease of $5 to $8 per metric ton, and
imports respond to the lower price levels.21
Table 17 shows trade flows of non-GM wheat to the EU, Japan, and S. Korea.  Under the
baseline scenario, the EU obtains its imports from North Dakota, and Japan and S. Korea import
from Canada.  Under scenario 1, Japan, S. Korea, and the EU import wheat from Canada because
of unsuccessful wheat segregation in the United States.  The level is slightly less than in the
baseline scenario because of higher wheat prices in Canada.  When GM is introduced in scenario
2, the EU imports most of their hard wheat requirements from the winter wheat region if
segregation is successful.  Japan and S. Korea continue to import from Canada.  When North
Dakota is prevented from producing GM wheat, export trade flows return to the baseline
scenario.  Under scenario 4, North Dakota exports 1.75 million metric tons to the EU and the
other states export 0.85 million metric tons.  When yields are increased under scenario 5, the EU
imports HRW wheat instead of HRS wheat.  When Canada produces GM wheat, most of the
imports are shifted to HRW wheat.  Canada still exports 0.24 million metric tons to Japan under
this scenario.   If the adoption rate of GM wheat is limited to 30%, North Dakota exports 57,900
metric tons to the EU, and Canada supplies all the exports to Japan and S. Korea.  If yields are
increased 10%, all the exports are from the winter wheat region.  When the segregation fee is
added to GM wheat instead of non-GM wheat, under scenario 9, North Dakota exports 0.11
million metric tons to the EU with the remaining hard wheat coming from the winter wheat
region.   Japan and S. Korea import from Canada.  When yields are increased 10%, North Dakota
and the ORS export to the EU, Canada exports to S. Korea, and Japan imports HRW wheat. 





2 116.85 114.71 2.14
3 116.32 115.77 0.55
4 114.36 112.21 2.15
5  111.45
6  116.68 114.58 2.10
7   114.26 112.15 2.11
8   106.75
9   114.38 110.24 4.14
10   113.96 109.81 4.15
Baseline) Baseline wheat flows;  Scenario 1) GM wheat production allowed in regions
ND and OSR, no wheat trade with the EU, Japan, or S. Korea;  2) GM wheat production
allowed in all spring wheat regions; 3) GM wheat production allowed in only region
OSR; 4) GM wheat  production allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30% adoption
level; 5) GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR but with a 10% yield
increase; 6) GM wheat  production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of both
countries; 7) GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of both
countries at the 30% adoption level; 8) GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat
growing regions of both countries with a 10% yield increase;  9) GM wheat production
allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30% adoption level and the segregation fee is
applied to GM wheat; 10) GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR with a
10% yield increase and the segregation fee is applied to GM wheat.22
Table 16. Imports of Hard Wheat Under Various Scenarios




263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263 263
Chile 231 236 231 231 231 232 231 231 235 231 231
China 903 904 903 903 903 903 903 903 903 903 903
Colombia 819 836 820 820 819 823 820 819 829 819 819
D.Republic 240 245 240 240 240 241 240 240 243 240 240
Ecuador 342 349 343 343 342 344 343 342 347 342 342
Egypt 1,545 1,545 1,545 1,545 1,545 1,545 1,545 1,545 1,545 1,545 1,545
EU 2,004 2,000 2,004 2,004 2,004 2,004 2,004 2,004 2,005 2,004 2,004
Guatemala 419 427 419 419 419 421 419 419 424 419 419
Indonesia 793 799 793 794 793 795 795 793 800 793 793
Iran 3,766 3,760 3,766 3,766 3,766 3,767 3,768 3,766 3,773 3,766 3,766
Iraq 283 284 283 283 283 283 283 283 284 283 283
Israel 525 526 526 525 525 526 526 525 526 525 525
Japan 3,692 3,690 3,692 3,692 3,692 3,693 3,692 3,692 3,693 3,692 3,692
Jordan 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291
Korea 825 790 826 826 825 832 820 821 836 825 825
Malaysia 475 478 475 475 475 476 476 475 479 475 475
Mexico 1,913 1,960 1,919 1,914 1,913 1,929 1,919 1,913 1,944 1,913 1,913
Nicaragua 1,704 2,047 1,705 1,705 1,704 1,713 1,705 1,704 1,725 1,704 1,704
Peru 666 679 666 666 666 669 666 666 674 666 666
Philippines 1,244 1,253 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,246 1,247 1,244 1,257 1,244 1,244
S. Lanka 269 269 269 269 269 269 269 269 269 269 269
Taiwan 876 878 876 876 876 877 877 876 878 876 876
Thailand 426 429 426 426 426 427 427 426 430 426 426
UAE 406 407 406 406 406 406 406 406 406 406 406
US 1,270 1,207 1,271 1,271 1,270 1,282 1,286 1,270 1,336 1,270 1,270
Venezuela 801 820 804 802 801 808 804 801 814 801 801
ROW 2,829 2,833 2,829 2,829 2,829 2,830 2,829 2,829 2,831 2,829 2,829
Total 29,820 30,204 29,833 29,827 29,820 29,892 29,850 29,816 30,038 29,820 29,820
Baseline) Baseline wheat flows;  Scenario 1) GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR, no wheat trade with the EU, Japan, or
S. Korea;  2) GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat regions; 3) GM wheat production allowed in only region OSR; 4) GM wheat 
production allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30% adoption level; 5) GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR but with a
10% yield increase; 6) GM wheat  production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of both countries; 7) GM wheat production
allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of both countries at the 30% adoption level; 8) GM wheat production allowed in all spring
wheat growing regions of both countries with a 10% yield increase;  9) GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30%
adoption level and the segregation fee is applied to GM wheat; 10) GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR with a 10% yield
increase and the segregation fee is applied to GM wheat.23






























Baseline 1860.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3428.6 767.1 0.0 6056.4
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3428.6 733.6 1857.1 6019.3
2 370.0 0.0 0.0 1739.2 0.0 3381.4 767.1 0.0 6257.7
3 1860.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3381.4 767.1 0.0 6009.3
4 1255.7 605.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3428.6 766.4 0.0 6055.7
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 2170.8 0.0 3428.6 772.1 0.0 6371.5
6 0.0 0.0 888.3 2170.8 1718.3 1955.0 0.0 0.0 6732.5
7 413.6 0.0 0.0 1690.8 0.0 3428.6 762.1 0.0 6295.1
8 0.0 0.0 905.8 2171.7 4000.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 7078.3
9 767.9 0.0 0.0 1275.8 0.0 3428.6 766.4 0.0 6238.7
10 767.9 1093.6 0.0 0.0 4000.0 0.0 766.4 0.0 6627.9
Baseline) Baseline wheat flows;  Scenario 1) GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR, no wheat trade with the EU,
Japan, or S. Korea;  2) GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat regions; 3) GM wheat production allowed in only region
OSR; 4) GM wheat  production allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30% adoption level; 5) GM wheat production allowed in
regions ND and OSR but with a 10% yield increase; 6) GM wheat  production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of both
countries; 7) GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of both countries at the 30% adoption level; 8) GM
wheat production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of both countries with a 10% yield increase;  9) GM wheat production
allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30% adoption level and the segregation fee is applied to GM wheat; 10) GM wheat production
allowed in regions ND and OSR with a 10% yield increase and the segregation fee is applied to GM wheat.
Loan Defaults
Table 18 shows the losses due to loan defaults by importing countries.  Compared to total
welfare, the losses are very small.  Under the Baseline scenario, the losses are $150,000 for
North Dakota exports and $2.05 million for HRW wheat.  When GM wheat is produced, losses
are $250,000 for North Dakota wheat and $1.98 million for HRW wheat.  Total U.S. losses are
$2.46 million under the baseline scenario and $2.47 million under scenario 2.24
Table 18. Losses Due To Commodity Loan Defaults
ND OSR WR
------------------Million $-----------------
Baseline 0.15 0.26 2.05
1 0.17 0.30 1.84
2 0.25 0.24 1.98
3 0.15 0.27 2.05
4 0.12 0.29 2.05
5 0.29 0.39 1.85
6 0.19 0.31 1.55
7 0.25 0.16 2.05
8 0.28 0.37 1.14
9 0.12 0.29 2.05
10 0.12 0.29 2.05
Baseline) Baseline wheat flows;  Scenario 1) GM wheat production
allowed in regions ND and OSR, no wheat trade with the EU, Japan, or S.
Korea;  2) GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat regions; 3)
GM wheat production allowed in only region OSR; 4) GM wheat 
production allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30% adoption level; 5)
GM wheat production allowed in regions ND and OSR but with a 10%
yield increase; 6) GM wheat  production allowed in all spring wheat
growing regions of both countries; 7) GM wheat production allowed in all
spring wheat growing regions of both countries at the 30% adoption level;
8) GM wheat production allowed in all spring wheat growing regions of
both countries with a 10% yield increase;  9) GM wheat production
allowed in regions ND and OSR at the 30% adoption level and the
segregation fee is applied to GM wheat; 10) GM wheat production allowed
in regions ND and OSR with a 10% yield increase and the segregation fee
is applied to GM wheat.
CONCLUSIONS
The potential introduction of GM wheat has raised consumer concerns over the safety of
the product.  Other GM crops were introduced with limited protest from the consuming public,
but Japan, the European Union, and S. Korea have stated that they will not import GM wheat.
Many other nations have raised concerns about GM foods and have developed labeling
requirements indicating GM ingredients.
Previous research on the impacts of GM adoption were based on the assumption that the
United States and Canada will not develop an affordable system to segregate GM and non-GM
wheat.  Therefore, if either country licenses GM wheat, they will lose markets that will not
accept GM wheat because all wheat will be viewed as containing some GM material.  However,
if there is a potential return to be generated for the handling/transportation system with
segregation, the means or processes may be developed to assure that segregation occurs,
although there is no indication that it is possible.  This study looked at both assumptions.  Since
it is unknown at this time whether GM wheat and non-GM wheat will be segregated, as in the
case of soybeans, both cases are addressed in this study.   25
The objective of this study is to estimate the impact of the introduction of GM wheat on
the North Dakota wheat industry, other spring wheat regions both in the United States and
Canada, and the HRW wheat growing regions.  Secondary objectives are to estimate price levels,
producer benefits, trade flow changes, and changes in consumer benefits.
A spatial equilibrium model is developed to evaluate the trade impacts associated with
GM wheat introduction and several plausible post-GM adoption scenarios.  Both HRS wheat and
HRW wheat are modeled, and HRS wheat is divided into non-GM and GM categories. 
Substitution between spring and winter wheat is allowed by converting wheat into protein
equivalents.  The United States was divided into three producing regions and Canada was
divided into the four western provinces.  There are 26 importing countries and a rest of the world
region. 
The total trade volume of exported hard wheat changes very little under the various
scenarios.  Since import demand is inelastic, imports remain relatively constant with small
changes in price, but there is a change in trade flows.  When GM wheat is introduced, the
countries restricting GM wheat import non-GM wheat from other sources resulting in little
change in volume or price.  Prices for GM wheat typically are $2.10 to $2.15 per metric ton less
than non-GM wheat, except for the scenario in which segregation is unsuccessful.  GM wheat
price is about $4.14 per metric ton less when segregation fees are applied to GM wheat.  If the
U.S. marketing/transportation system is unable to develop an affordable and dependable
segregation system, the price of all U.S. wheat falls about $11 per metric ton, or about $0.30 per
bushel.
Welfare for producers who raise GM wheat increases slightly at the expense of both non-
GM wheat producers and HRW wheat producers.  Both total producer and consumer welfare
increase slightly when GM wheat is produced, if segregation is successful.
Several issues concerning GM wheat remain to be studied.  The glyphosate-tolerant gene
is identifiable; therefore, that attribute can be priced.  Since the GM trait is viewed as a negative
attribute in many markets, it can be expected to result in a price discount.  Importing countries
who accept GM wheat will import it at a discount.  Also, U.S. millers and bakers may discount
GM wheat because the GM attribute is identifiable.  The discount price is unknown at this time.
Producers will not produce GM wheat just because it is available.  The production cost
savings and convenience will have to offset the higher seed cost.  Also, if the market price for
GM wheat is substantially lower than for non-GM wheat, it may not be adopted by producers. 
There are also rotational concerns with the production of a second GM crop.  The volunteer GM
crop is difficult to control if followed by another GM crop.
The ability of the transportation and marketing system in the United States to develop a
method to segregate GM and non-GM wheat is a major unknown factor at this time.  If an
affordable and dependable system cannot be developed, all wheat from the United States will be
viewed as GM wheat regardless of the class.  In that case, the U.S. will lose all the markets for
countries who reject GM wheat.  That loss of markets may include other classes of wheat.  Also,
if a price discount occurs, all U.S. wheat would face that discount, in which case, the production
of GM wheat would reduce wheat prices in the United States and producer welfare.26
The study indicates that the main determining factor for the profitability of GM wheat
production is the ability of the marketing/transportation system to develop a segregation system
which is affordable, dependable, and acceptable to foreign consumers.  The consumer has
become the driving force in agriculture today.  More and more commodities are being produced
for specific end-uses and with specific attributes.  Importers, along with the consumers, will need
to accept the integrity of a segregation system, which will allow them to purchase segregated
non-GM wheat from the United States.  If that acceptance can not be developed, the introduction
of GM wheat, while benefitting a few producers, will lower total producer welfare in the United
States. 27
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Appendix 
           
Table 1. Calculated Transportation Costs For Origin-Destination Routes 
Origin   Manitoba Sask Alberta B.C. ND OSR WR
Destination ---------------------------------$/metric  ton------------------------------------- 
Bangladesh 50.54 46.75 41.22 40.94 51.30 51.30 40.11
Chile 49.69 40.41 34.88 34.60 45.82 45.82 35.34
China 40.83 36.57 31.04 30.76 43.44 43.44 31.10
Colombia 46.01 46.26 40.73 40.45 34.11 34.11 23.88
D. Republic 43.70 44.91 39.38 39.10 28.80 28.80 23.45
Ecuador 52.76 35.36 29.83 29.55 39.46 39.46 27.10
Egypt 44.70 45.91 40.38 40.10 30.47 30.47 28.50
EU 43.61 43.61 40.53 40.25 27.20 27.20 28.05
Guatemala 45.01 45.26 39.73 39.45 27.86 27.86 22.88
Indonesia 46.76 46.48 40.95 40.67 51.59 51.59 46.07
Iran 50.54 62.06 68.01 73.59 39.06 39.06 35.76
Iraq 50.54 62.06 68.01 73.59 39.06 39.06 35.76
Israel 45.70 61.22 67.17 72.75 31.47 31.47 29.80
Japan 41.54 37.28 31.75 31.47 44.72 44.72 39.20
Jordan 45.70 61.22 67.17 72.75 31.47 31.47 29.80
S. Korea 39.61 35.35 29.82 29.54 42.54 42.54 37.02
Malaysia 46.50 41.83 36.30 36.02 47.77 47.77 42.25
Mexico 40.43 35.37 29.84 29.56 25.60 25.60 30.31
Nicaragua 45.01 45.26 39.73 39.45 27.86 27.86 22.88
Peru 53.22 36.36 30.83 30.55 40.46 40.46 28.10
Philippines 43.74 39.48 33.95 33.67 46.08 46.08 40.56
S. Lanka 50.54 61.06 67.01 72.59 39.06 39.06 34.76
Taiwan 41.60 37.34 31.81 31.53 44.00 44.00 38.48
Thailand 44.75 40.49 34.96 34.68 44.89 44.89 39.37
UAE 50.54 62.06 68.01 73.59 39.06 39.06 35.76
US 18.54 24.14 29.73 41.89 0.00 0.00 0.00
Venezuela 44.01 44.40 38.87 38.59 25.94 25.94 25.30
ROW 44.46 44.69 40.06 40.16 31.70 31.70 27.62